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Abstract. This article, the first of a two-part essay, presents an account of Aristotelian 
hylomorphic animalism that engages with recent work on neuroscience and philos-
ophy of mind. I show that Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is compatible with the 
new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology, but that it is incompatible 
with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. I begin with the basic claims of 
Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism and focus on its understanding of psychological 
powers embodied in the nervous system. Next, I introduce the new mechanist approach 
to neuroscience and psychology and illustrate how it can enrich the more abstract 
ontological framework of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism. In the third section of 
this article I establish in detail the many ways Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism 
is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. Based on these 
fundamental differences I show why a criticism leveled against emergentism by the 
new mechanist philosophy does not hamper my proposed rapprochement between 
hylomorphism and the new mechanist philosophy. This conclusion, however, leaves 
untouched the problem I address in the second article, namely, is the new mechanist 
philosophy compatible with Aristotelian philosophical anthropology’s contention that 
intellectual operations are immaterial and interact with the psychosomatic operations 
of the rational animal?
Keywords: Hylomorphism; Animalism; New Mechanist Philosophy; Neuroscience; Psy-
chology; Philosophical Anthropology; Aristotelianism; Thomas Aquinas; Emergentism.
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Abbreviations for the works of St. Thomas Aquinas
De Pot Quaestiones disputatae de potentia
In DA  Sentencia libri De anima
SCG Summa contra gentiles
ST  Summa theologiae
There are numerous challenges that confront the prospects of a contempo-
rary Aristotelian or Thomist philosophical anthropology. This two-part essay 
tackles one of those challenges head on. I present a speculative framework 
for characterizing the integrative interaction of immaterial intellectual 
operations with other psychological operations that are embodied in the 
nervous system. Why might this interaction be a problem?
Thomas Aquinas’s account of Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism presents 
an ontology of natural substances and their attributes. This hylomorphic 
ontology of natural things includes inanimate elements and mixts, as well 
as living beings such as plants and animals. Human persons complicate 
Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism. This is because, medieval Neo-Aristotelians, 
like Aquinas, argued that the unique rational and intellectual operations 
of humans, which evince that they are persons, set them apart from other 
hylomorphic animals that are constituted from an animating sensory soul 
that is the substantial form of an organic material body. These intellectual 
operations transcend the conditions of matter and are grounded in the 
immaterial rational soul of the human person. The difficulty is that the 
intellectual nature of the rational soul and its immateriality seem to be 
incompatible with the ontology of hylomorphic animalism (HMA) and its 
account of the soul as the substantial form of a material body. Aquinas and 
other scholastics proposed a variety of unified and eclectic solutions to this 
tension, and Thomists up to the present continue to defend, develop, and 
elucidate Aquinas’s approach to this problem. For the sake of simplicity, 
I call this latter position Thomist hylomorphic personalism (THP).
This essay contributes to these Thomist efforts to resolve certain ap-
parent tensions in THP that concern the interaction of the human person’s 
immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic sensory 
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operations that are constituted from the formal organization of the nervous 
system. Accordingly, I take for granted a number of contentious philosophical 
and scientific claims about human persons and their powers that these 
interaction problems presuppose. This first article sets up the background 
to the interaction problem for THP; in the second article, I address the 
problem of noetic and psychosomatic interaction for THP.
This first article commences with the basic claims of Neo-Aristotelian 
hylomorphic animalism and its account of embodied psychological powers 
and operations (§I). I then illustrate how hylomorphic animalism is enriched 
by the new mechanist philosophy’s approach to biology, neuroscience, and 
psychology (§II). The rest of this two-part essay is dedicated to establishing 
the compatibility of a Thomist hylomorphism with empirical psychology 
and neuroscience as it is explicated by the new mechanist philosophy (NMP). 
One potential barrier is related to the rejection of strong emergentism (SE) by 
proponents of NMP. In the third section (§III) of this paper, I address why 
hylomorphic animalism is not a form of strong emergentism. I then draw 
attention to the similar reasons given by both HMA and NMP for rejecting SE 
and the Crypto-Cartesian framework that generates it. But this conclusion 
introduces a new difficulty, for HMA’s and NMP’s objections to strong emer-
gence seem to apply no less to THP, which maintains that the intellectual 
powers of any person are immaterial. I take this challenge seriously. In the 
second article, I address this challenge and other difficulties with the Thomist 
account of the interaction of noetic and psychosomatic operations. 
1. Aristotelian Hylomorphic Animalism
Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism is the view that all natural substances, 
that is, of concrete dynamic individual wholes, are constituted from two 
fundamental ontological principles: substantial form and matter. Form and 
matter are not concrete parts that can be recognized through perceptual 
understanding. What we intelligently perceive are natural substances and 
their attributes, not their substantial form and matter. Substantial form and 
matter are known through an intellectual analysis of the natural substances 
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we intelligently perceive; form and matter are the ontological principles 
that ground and explain the dynamic unity exhibited in composite physical 
substances. A salient feature of hylomorphism is its contention that form 
or organization is a fundamental ontological primitive which actualizes 
and organizes matter; for hylomorphism, there is no actual matter without 
actual formal organization. The composition of substantial form united 
to organized matter in every natural substance also grounds each of the 
substance’s organized material attributes. Like the substance itself, the 
attributes of hylomorphic substances are also composites of form and matter. 
These attributes can be comprised of a complex multileveled hierarchy of 
embodied causal powers that are constituted from organized systems and 
sub-systems with corresponding activities and subactivities. The causal 
powers of a physical substance’s higher-level attributes are constituted from 
the actual organization of the material potentialities they organize and 
integrate into the substance’s higher-level systems. Because a substance’s 
higher-level systems are composed from the organized materials of the 
substance’s lower-level systems—such as neurophysiological systems consti-
tuted from the organization of more basic organic biochemical systems—the 
causal powers and activities of higher-level attributes do not violate or 
compete with, but are enabled by and enlist the activities of the lower-level 
organic, molecular, atomic, and subatomic systems of the substance. Given 
the plurality of such causal powers, hylomorphism is committed to a form 
of property, causal, and explanatory pluralism (Jaworski 2016; Oderberg 
2007; Koons 2014; Lonergan 1992; Wallace 1996; Feser 2014).
This rough sketch of Aristotelian hylomorphism in general provides the 
point of departure for hylomorphic animalism, which combines hylomorphism 
with a version of animalism (Jaworski 2011, chap. 12; Toner 2011; Thornton 
2016; Olson Forthcoming). Hylomorphic animalism (HMA) contends that 
the best way to get a philosophical grip on the nature of psychological 
powers and their operations is to start with the putative fact that animals 
(so, not just human animals) are psychosomatic substances with a complex 
range of integrated biological and psychological attributes. Contemporary 
versions of animalism start with claims about the animality of humans; 
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Aristotelian animalism starts with claims about animals and their hylo-
morphic constitution before considering the animality specific to human 
persons. Animalism, here, means that animals are fundamental entities; 
animals are unified psychosomatic wholes that are not only more than the 
sum of their parts, the actualization, identity, and subsistence conditions 
of an animal’s material parts are determined by its substantial form. Ad-
ditionally, hylomorphic animalism, like most other forms of animalism, 
maintains that the identity conditions of animals are not tied up with the 
continuity of their psychological, mental, or conscious states and operations, 
but with the persistence of the animal as a hylomorphically composed 
organic substance. Indeed, it is the animal qua substance that grounds the 
complex organization of material attributes that enables the ontogenetic 
development of psychological powers and their conscious manifestations. 
HMA distinguishes the persistence of the substance of the animal from the 
panoply of psychosomatic powers grounded in the substance, and these 
powers are distinct from the operations or manifestations of these powers.
Hylomorphism in general, and hylomorphic animalism in particular, are 
neutral with respect to the more contentious claims of Thomas Aquinas and 
others who maintain that human persons are a different kind of hylomorphic 
animal, namely one with an immaterial the intellectual soul that grounds 
its immaterial noetic powers and operations. In other words, THP amplifies 
and expands upon the more basic and less controversial claims of HMA. 
Before addressing what THP adds to HMA, let us consider in more detail 
the hylomorphic animalism defended by Aquinas and Thomists, beginning 
with the way the soul and its psychological powers and operations animate 
and organize the organic materials that constitute an animal.
For Aquinas’s HMA, “The soul is the actuality of an organic body as [this 
is] what it perfects primarily and proportionately.” (ST I.76.8ad2)1 Because 
1 All translations from the works of Thomas Aquinas are my own unless stated otherwise. 
Since this is not an exegetical study of Aquinas, but a philosophical essay intended for an 
interdisciplinary audience, my translations focus more on communicating the meaning of 
the text to a contemporary audience, than on a literal translation of technical Scholastic 
nomenclature.
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the soul is the animating substantial form that organizes the organic body 
of the animal,
the whole soul is in each part of the body by totality of perfection and essence, 
but not by totality of power. For the soul is not in each part of the body with 
respect to each of its powers; but is in the eye with respect to vision and in the 
ear with respect to audition, and so forth. Notice, however, that since the soul 
requires a diversity of parts, it is not related to the whole and to the parts in 
the same way. The soul is related to the whole primarily and essentially (per se), 
as the whole is what it primarily and proportionately perfects. By contrast, the 
soul is related to the parts derivatively (per posterius), as they are ordered to 
the whole. (ST I.76.8)
Aquinas distinguishes between the soul’s perfective actualization of the 
entire body that thereby constitutes the complete essence or nature of the 
animal, from the way the soul grounds and enables the embodied powers 
of the animal. In the latter case, the soul does not animate the entire body, 
but informs distinct parts or zones of the body with the distinct animation 
and organization that constitutes the biofunctional parts and psychoso-
matic powers of the animal, endowing it with psychosomatic potencies for 
psychosomatic operations.2 The soul’s animating organization of organs 
enables, for instance, the psychosomatic power of vision (which is constituted 
from the appropriate organization of the material components of such 
organs as the eyes, retina, optic nerve, lateral geniculate nucleus, visual 
cortex, and so forth) in one way that is distinct from the way it animates 
the bodily organs of the ear, cochlea, auditory cortex, and so forth, which 
constitute the power of audition. In short, HMA holds that an animal is 
constituted as a substance by virtue of the soul’s abiding organizational 
animation that pervades the entire organic body. But, the vegetative and 
sentient psychosomatic powers that are animated and enabled by the soul 
do not permeate the entire body; rather, they are distributed with respect 
to the biofunctional parts and organs they uniquely in-form and animate.
2 See Aquinas, ST I.75.3; 76.8; 77.5; 84.6–8; 85.1 89.1; 89.5; I-II.17.7–9; In DA II, lt. 2; SCG 
II.57; 82; De Pot. 3.9ad22. On biofunctional parts, see Jaworski 2016 chap. 6.4. See Oder-
berg 2017 for an account of organs abtaining a substantial form.
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Following Avicenna and Albert, Aquinas maintains that humans and 
other animals possess a number psychosomatic powers owing to their 
sensory soul. Aquinas distinguishes five external apprehensive senses, four 
internal apprehensive senses (Gestalt sense, i.e., sensus communis, imagi-
nation, estimation, memory), two sensual appetites for hedonic affectivity, 
motivation, and emotion, and a range of motoric powers (See ST I.78.1–4; 
De Haan 2014a; De Haan 2014b; Stock 1958). All of these sensory powers 
and their manifestations are psychosomatically constituted and embodied 
in the organs they organize. Aquinas, like other medieval Neo-Aristotelians, 
located the internal sense powers and their functions in the ventricles of the 
brain. Of course, neurobiology has directed the attention of psychologists 
and philosophers away from the ventricles in the brain and towards the 
nervous system, and especially towards the brain’s neural and glial cells, 
assemblies, and systems. Despite such incredible advances in neurobiology 
and neuropsychology, contentious questions about the localization and 
distribution of psychological abilities in the brain remains as lively as ever 
(Anderson 2014). 
The psychosomatic powers of enactive sensation, enactive estimative 
perception and registration,3 imagination, memory, and capacities for 
motivation and executive functions enable animals to intentionalize and 
interact with information from their environment.4 The exercise of these 
3 I use “enactive” in the technical sense employed by philosophers and scientists influ-
enced by James Gibson’s ecological psychology. Alva Noë states that, “According to the 
enactive approach, perceptual content becomes available to experience when perceivers 
have practical mastery of the ways sensory stimulation varies as a result of movement.” 
Noë 2004, 199. The adjective enactive signals the qualification that a certain cognitive 
operation is inextricably tied to its embodied manifestation and dynamic engagement 
with objects in the environment. I use “registration” and its cognates in a technical way 
that captures the wide range of psychological functions Aquinas attributes to the cogita-
tive power in humans and the estimative power in other animals, which intersects nicely 
with many of the ways that “registration” is used to describe the higher-level psycholog-
ical abilities of animals by Bermudez 2003; Butterfill and Apperly 2013; De Haan 2014a, 
2014b; Hutto 2012.
4 Psychological powers intentionalize information in diverse ways. Intentionality denotes 
the distinctive way that psychological operations enable the animal to cognize about or 
have cognitive acts that are directed towards their objects. For instance, memories are 
about the objects I remember and my desire to eat is directed towards food.
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psychological powers is critical for satisfying the complex biopsychosocial 
imperatives directed towards the survival and flourishing of animals. Many 
of the animal’s psychological powers not only enable it to intentionalize 
information but to do so consciously. So, for example, the power of vision 
enables animals to intentionalize visible information such that they can 
consciously see visible things in the environment. The animal’s ability to 
consciously see intentionalized visual information is explained in part by the 
integrated operation of its various psychological powers. When exercised, 
psychological powers like vision enlist a coordinated manifestation of 
a complex range of psychosomatic powers or mechanisms that constitute 
the activity of seeing. All of the psychological activities that an animal 
performs in its environment are comprised of the organized manifestation 
of the powers of the animal’s biofunctional parts and the surrounding 
materials in the world. For HMA, the animal has the psychological powers 
and operations it does because its biofunctional parts, like the nervous 
system, are psychosomatically organized in such a way that the organized 
manifestation of the powers of these biofunctional parts (in conjunction 
with any reciprocal powers of surrounding materials in the environment) 
can be harnessed by the psychosomatic activities of the animal (See Braine 
1992; Oderberg 2007; Jaworski 2016). Because the animal’s psychological 
operations—like seeing, hearing, enactive perception and executive reg-
istrations—are essentially psychosomatic, there is no dichotomy between 
consciously seeing and the processes of the nervous system. The animal’s 
operation of consciously seeing is hylomorphically constituted from the 
organization of the complex hierarchy of biological cum psychological 
components. The details of the latter story are provided by the empirical 
research of scientists, which are in turn systematically analyzed and made 
more ontologically perspicuous by philosophers of the special sciences. 
While HMA merely aims to provide a general ontological framework for 
understanding the nature of animals and their powers and operations, the 
new mechanist philosophy of biology, neuroscience, and psychology provides 
a lucid philosophical interpretation of these special sciences that can enrich 
HMA’s more general claims about the embodied psychological powers of 
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animals. Let us examine briefly the potential resources the new mechanist 
philosophy of science has for filling in the details left out by the ontolog-
ical framework of HMA. Elsewhere I have argued for the compatibility of 
hylomorphism and the new mechanist approach to biology, neuroscience, 
and psychology; I take this compatibility for granted here.
2. The New Mechanist Philosophy of Biology,  
Neuroscience, and Psychology
The new mechanist philosophy’s (NMP) approach to biology, neuroscience, 
and psychology gradually emerged over the past fifty years from a common 
set of concerns and interests in philosophy of science. The seminal paper 
of the new mechanists, “Thinking about Mechanisms,” by Peter Machamer, 
Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver, later known as MDC, begins:
In many fields of science what is taken to be a satisfactory explanation requires 
providing a description of a mechanism. So it is not surprising that much of the 
practice of science can be understood in terms of the discovery and description 
of mechanisms. (MDC 2000, 1)5
NMP distinguishes their account of mechanisms from the austere mech-
anistic ontologies developed by Descartes, Boyle, and many others since 
them. NMP is especially interested in the methods and actual practices 
of scientists searching for biochemical, genetic, neurophysiological, and 
psychological mechanisms. NMP rejects the forms of theoretical imperialism 
developed by logical empiricists that aimed to reduce all scientific theories 
to the laws of theoretical physics. Additionally, unlike historical accounts 
of mechanisms, new mechanists reject the idea that the mechanisms in-
vestigated in the life sciences are machines or are anything like machines. 
At best, some machines are pale imitations of biological mechanisms, for 
unlike endogenously active organisms, machines do not build, sustain, 
5 See Bechtel 2007; Bechtel and Richardson 2010; Craver and Darden 2013; Craver and 
Tabery 2016; Glennan 2016; Maley and Piccinini 2017.
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and repair themselves. Furthermore, according to Carl Craver and other 
proponents of NMP, mechanisms are not essentially (a) deterministic (they 
are also stochastic), (b) reductionistic (most require multilevel irreducible 
organization), or (c) localizable (they are highly distributed in the brain) 
(See Craver 2007; Craver and Darden 2013). NMPs identify four elements 
that are characteristic of mechanisms.
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component 
parts, component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated func-
tioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena. (Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen 2005, 423)
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they exhibit the 
explanandum phenomenon. (Craver 2007, 6)
Let us take note of some obvious points of overlap between hylomorphism 
and NMP’s account of these four elements of mechanisms: phenomenon, 
component entities, component activities, and organization.6
2.1 The Mechanisms of the New Mechanists
A phenomenon is variously described as the behavior or the manifestation 
of a capacity or power of the mechanism taken as a whole. For instance, 
the mechanism for protein synthesis synthesizes proteins and the mech-
anism for an action potential generates an action potential. Mechanisms 
explain how organized component entities and their activities produce, 
underlie, or maintain some phenomenon. Entities and their causal activities 
or operations constitute the two kinds of component parts of a mechanism. 
Mechanisms studied in neuroscience, for example, consist of component 
entities (like neural membranes, Ca2+ channels, Ca2+ ions, intracellular 
molecules, vesicles containing neurotransmitters) that causally interact with 
other component entities through diverse causal operations (like opening, 
diffusing, docking, fusing, phosphorylating, and priming) (Craver 2007, 5; 
6 For a comparative study of hylomorphism and the new mechanist philosophy, see De 
Haan 2017.
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Glennan 2009; Craver and Darden 2013). According to MDC, “Activities are 
the producers of change. They are constitutive of the transformations that 
yield new states of affairs or new products. Reference to activities is moti-
vated by ontic, descriptive, and epistemological concerns.” (MDC 2000, 4; 
see Glennan 2009, sec. 5) Significantly, despite the range of views about the 
nature of causality maintained by different new mechanists,
New mechanists have in general been at pains both (1) to liberate the relevant 
causal notion from any overly austere view that restricts causation to only 
a small class of phenomena (such as collisions, attraction/repulsion, or energy 
conservation), and (2) to distance themselves from the Humean, regularist 
conception of causation common among logical empiricists. (Craver and Tabery 
2016, sec. 2.3)
In short, like Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism, NMP’s account of the causal 
activities of component entities of mechanisms endorses a kind of property, 
causal, and explanatory pluralism.
More significant, however, is NMP’s realist account of organization as 
an irreducible ontological and explanatory factor in every mechanism. NMP 
recognizes that spatial, temporal, and active organization of component 
entities and their activities taken together constitute a mechanism. Active 
organization, in particular, is essential, for it enables component entities 
to make a causal difference to other component entities in the mechanism. 
“There are no mechanisms without active organization, and no mechanistic 
explanation is complete or correct if it does not capture correctly the 
mechanism’s active organization.” (Craver 2007, 136).
Active organization distinguishes mechanisms from mere aggregates (or heaps) 
of matter, such as piles of sand. The parts act and interact with one another in 
such a way that the whole is literally not a mere sum of its parts. Mechanisms 
are in this sense nonaggregative: the parts of the mechanism are organized in 
ways that go beyond, e.g., the contribution made by the mass of a grain of sand 
to the mass of the pile. Mechanisms are not mere sums of properties of their 
component parts…. (Craver and Darden 2013, 20)
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Like hylomorphism, NMP maintains that organization is an irreducible 
ontological and explanatory principle that makes a difference with respect to 
the causal operations of the component entities it organizes. “Organization 
is the interlevel relation between a mechanism as a whole and its compo-
nents. Lower-level components are made up into higher-level components 
by organizing them spatially, temporally, and actively into something 
greater than a mere sum of the parts.” (Craver 2007, 189). Mechanisms, “by 
virtue of their organization, are able to do things that their parts cannot do 
individually. They can respond to inputs that the parts alone cannot detect. 
They can produce behaviors that their parts alone cannot produce. There 
are generalizations about causal relevance that are true of mechanisms and 
false of their parts.” (Craver 2007, 227 My emphasis).
Finally, as with hylomorphism, NMP also endorses an antireductionist 
account of the levels of mechanisms discovered in biology, neuroscience, 
and psychology. NMP acknowledges the ubiquitous presence of mechanisms 
throughout the world of living organisms that are constituted from complex 
hierarchies of levels of organized causal components (Craver and Tabery 
2016, sec. 2.4.1). The powers of the higher-level mechanisms, say, the visual 
system, depend upon the coordinated manifestation of the organized causal 
powers of lower-level systems that constitute the higher-level mechanisms.
The ubiquity of mechanism dependence is a consequence of the hierarchical 
organization of mechanical systems and processes, and it explains how pro-
ductive continuity at lower levels in the mechanistic hierarchy give rise to 
higher level forms of production. Productive powers of wholes derive from the 
organization of their parts, and the productive continuity of causal processes 
derives from productive interactions of parts at various stages in the process. 
(Glennan 2016, 811)
For instance, the mechanisms that underlie the action potential of a neuron are:
organized together spatially, temporally, causally, and hierarchically such that 
transmitters are released when the axon terminal depolarizes. The voltage-sen-
sitive ion channels are located in the terminal, they span the membrane, and 
they open to expose a channel. Biochemical cascades in the cytoplasm have 
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sequences or cycles of interactions, they are organized in series and in parallel, 
and their steps have different orders, rates and durations. The components in 
the mechanism often stand in mechanism/component relations, a species of 
part–whole relation. As a result the mechanism is hierarchically organized. 
The behavior of the mechanism as a whole requires the organization of its 
components. (Craver 2007, 6)
William Bechtel, Craver, and many other new mechanists distinguish 
between intralevel causal relations and interlevel constitutive relations. Given 
common contemporary philosophical assumptions that all causation is 
efficient causation, that cause and effect must be distinct entities, and all 
causal relationships are contingent and diachronic, they argue that there 
cannot be any interlevel causal relations between wholes and their parts. 
Causation concerns the intralevel operations among organized component 
entities at the same level in a mechanism, which are distinct from each 
other and are contingently related. It is constitution that captures the kind 
of synchronic dependency between wholes and their parts, especially those 
that pertain to the interlevel relations between levels of mechanisms. The 
behavior of a mechanism, taken as a whole, is thereby constituted from the 
organization of its component entities and operations, which are not wholly 
distinct or contingently related as parts of a whole.7
The behavior of the whole is dependent on the behavior of the components in such 
a way that interventions to change the components can change the behavior of 
the whole and vice versa. While there are not interlevel causal relations in [levels 
of mechanisms], there are many interlevel relations of dependency, and thereby 
interlevel relations of regularity and predictability. One can disrupt spatial memory 
by ablating the hippocampus or knocking out NMDA receptors. (Craver 2007, 183)
Our earlier sketch of HMA’s account of embodied psychological powers 
can accommodate and be enriched by NMP’s presentation of mechanisms 
7 In De Haan 2017 I argue that these interlevel constitutive relations of organized compo-
nents are similar (if not equivalent) to Neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism’s account of the 
union of formal and material causality, which explain the way formally organized material 
components constitute a whole.
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in biology, neuroscience, and psychology. When an animal exercises its 
power of vision, this operation enlists the coordinated manifestation of 
a complex hierarchy of levels of powers nested in psychosomatic systems 
that range from such neural systems as the eyes, lateral geniculate nucleus, 
visual cortex, dorsal and ventral visual streams, to various subsystem 
neural assemblies, down to the myriad extracellular and intracellular 
neural, glial, and synaptic events that are constituted from the organized 
interactions of neurotransmitters, ion channels, ions, and so forth, as well 
as the organelles and various intracellular interactions. Craver and Bechtel 
provide the following illustration of a complex psychosomatic behavior of 
a human person, namely, that of Hal playing tennis and the mechanisms 
for glucose metabolism.
Hal’s tennis-playing also alters the behavior of innumerable biochemical 
pathways and cellular mechanisms that are involved in his tennis playing, both 
in the short-term and in the long-term. Why did Hal’s cells start using more 
glucose (i.e., binding glucose into molecules of hexosediphosphate)? Because 
Hal started to play tennis. Similar stories could be told about Hal’s respiratory 
mechanisms, visual system, and many others besides. Changing the behavior 
of the mechanism as a whole changed the activities of its components. It may 
be appropriate to say that the components are along for the ride, but if so, this 
is a different, more active, kind of ride than [when water moves because I move 
a cup that contains the water]. Hal’s glucoregulatory mechanisms are enlisted 
in the ride. When Hal started to play tennis, the nerve signals to the muscles 
caused them to metabolize the available ATP to ADP to provide the energy to 
contract the muscle cells. The increase in ADP made it available as a receptor 
for phosphates in high-energy bonds in 1,3-diphosphoglycerate produced at the 
end of the glycolytic process. This allowed a cascade of reactions earlier in the 
pathway to proceed, eventually allowing a glucose molecule to take up a phos-
phate from another ATP molecule, initiating the glycolysis of that molecule. 
This is the sort of case for which appeal to top-down causation seems most 
compelling. However, the case can be described without remainder by appeal 
only to intra-level causes and to constitutive relations: the ‘effect’ of the tennis 
match on glucose metabolism is mediated by a mechanism. In outline: Hal’s 
playing tennis is in part constituted by activities at neuromuscular junctions, 
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and activities at those junctions cause, in a perfectly straightforward etiological 
sense, changes in the organization and behavior of cellular mechanisms. Even 
if this is made possible by the incorporation of complex interactions, including 
feedback loops, inside the mechanism, there is nothing mysterious about ap-
pealing to a change at a higher level to explain a change at a lower level. Once 
we have described the mechanism mediating the effect, the drive to speak of 
this as a case of top-down causation vanishes, although such language might be 
useful as shorthand. As long as an analysis like that offered above is available, 
there is nothing problematic in so using it. (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 559–60)
Empirical investigations continue to produce more detailed and accurate 
descriptions and explanations of how these psychological and neurobio-
logical mechanisms and systems are integrated together to constitute the 
manifestation of the animal’s psychosomatic abilities. This empirical task 
belongs to neuroscience and neuropsychology, not to philosophy. There 
are, however, a number of philosophical issues to be flagged concerning 
this proposed union between HMA and NMP. The most significant for our 
purposes concerns NMP’s challenge to strong emergentism (SE).8 
8 Some proponents of NMP integrate the information processing mechanisms postulated 
by cognitive science into their accounts of the hierarchy of psychological and neurophys-
iological mechanisms. It is beyond the aims of this paper to address the (in)compatibility 
of HMA with the surfeit of idealized models of animal behavior from cognitive psycho-
logical and cognitive neuroscience. Nonetheless, a few points of clarification are in or-
der. First, unless stated otherwise, this paper does not employ such terms as “cognitive” 
“cognition”—as they are employed in cognitive science, cognitive psychology, and cog-
nitive neuroscience—to mean computational information processes over causal and/or 
intentional representations by fully or partially modular “cognitive” components. Rather, 
I employ “cognition” in much the same way Aquinas uses the term “cognitio,” namely, 
as an analogous term that applies to a range of personal or animal level apprehensive 
powers and their conscious and intentional operations like vision, tactility, imagination, 
memory, and understanding. Second, if cognitive science’s idealized models are interpret-
ed realistically (and not instrumentally via a Dennett–style intentional stance), then such 
“cognitive mechanisms” can only be attributed to sub-personal level processes and not to 
personal level powers and operations for enactive perception or rational and intentional 
action. I develop this distinction more in the next section. For the relevant debates about 
cognitive science, see Anderson 2014; Bechtel 2007, 2009; Chemero 2011; Hutto and Myin 
2012, 2017; Piccinini and Craver 2011; Ramsey 2007.
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2.2 The New Mechanists and Strong Emergentism
SE is a form of irreducible ontological emergentism that is distinct from 
the less contentious weak emergentism, which often amounts to a form of 
epistemological emergence (Bedau and Humphreys 2008). SE is motivated 
by a number of important philosophical arguments, but many proponents 
of SE also look to empirical work in neuroscience and psychology for sci-
entific support of emergentism, such as purported scientific evidence of 
top-down causation where irreducible higher-level systems produce effects 
on lower-level systems. According to NMP, a closer examination of the 
empirical evidence of top-down causation appealed to by SE turns out to 
rest upon category mistakes and conceptual confusions. This empirical 
evidence does not substantiate the ambitious metaphysical claims of SE 
for it can be adequately explained by NMP’s account of mechanistically 
mediated effects. Bechtel and Craver provide a revisionary interpretation 
of empirically discovered instances of purportedly bottom-up or top-down 
causation that explains such evidence in terms of their account of intralevel 
causal relations and interlevel constitutive relations. Bechtel and Craver think 
there is a great deal of confusion about causality, constitution, and emergence 
in both philosophical and scientific literature on top-down causation. What 
scientists are in fact discovering are not top-down causes, but instances of 
mechanistically mediated effects, which are hybrids of constitutive and causal 
relations that explain levels of mechanisms (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 547).
The shroud of mystery surrounding interlevel causation arises from the assump-
tion that the interlevel relation in such cases is both constitutive and causal at 
once. On our view, the interlevel relationship is only constitutive. This hybrid 
framework provides a way to understand most, if not all, the cases for which 
appeal to top-down causes seems compelling. There may be cases that cannot 
be handled by this account, but if there are, those who invoke the notion of 
top-down causation for them owe us an account of just what is involved. … 
Although our explication of interlevel causation in terms of mechanistically 
mediated effects renders reference to top-down causation unproblematic, it 
does not show that the phenomenon is unimportant. The biological world, 
and much of the world besides, is populated by multilevel mechanisms. Talk 
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of interlevel causation is merely a misleading way to talk about an explanatory 
interlevel relationship that, upon close inspection, does not involve interlevel 
causes. (Craver and Bechtel 2007, 562)
They conclude with a challenge to SE’s claim that neuroscience provides 
empirical support for their position. In particular, Bechtel and Craver are 
suspicious of strong emergentists that look to neuroscience for validation of 
their view that the ontological emergence of mental properties from the com-
plex organized physical properties of the brain is a kind of brute emergence.
[O]ne who insists that there is no explanation for a nonrelational property of 
the whole in terms of the properties of its component parts-plus-organization 
advocates a spooky form of emergence. Indeed, levels of mechanisms are levels 
of ontic mechanistic explanation. Advocates of the spooky emergence of higher-
-level properties must have in mind a different sense of ‘‘level’’ altogether. 
Advocates of spooky emergence cannot therefore appeal to levels of mechanisms 
to make their view seem familiar and unmysterious. (Craver 2007, 217)
NMP’s challenge to SE says nothing about the independent philosophical 
arguments for SE and its account of brute emergent laws; what NMP contends 
is that SE cannot maintain both that there are no mechanistic explanations 
for its purported mental properties and that there is empirical evidence 
from neuroscience that supports SE. Why does NMP’s challenge to SE not 
threaten our proposed union between HMA and NMP? After all, HMA, like 
SE, maintains that higher-level attributes have irreducible powers that make 
a difference to the coordinated manifestation of lower-level powers. To see 
why NMP’s challenge does not undermine the proposed union between NMP 
and HMA, we must distinguish HMA from SE.
3. Hylomorphic Animalism and Strong Emergentism
Many Aristotelian hylomorphists are attracted to scientific and philosophical 
presentations of emergence and top-down causation, especially because 
emergentist theories defend a nonreductive view of reality. The temptation 
to combine hylomorphism and emergentism is understandable as both 
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positions endorse irreducible accounts of the mind; however, it is important 
to realize that not all irreducible theories of mind are created equal. More to 
the point, many nonreductive theories remain fundamentally incompatible 
with each other, like hylomorphism with emergentism and its older cousin, 
interactionist substance dualism. In this section, I draw attention to a few 
reasons why I think contemporary Aristotelian hylomorphists would be better 
off, not muddying the waters by associating their causal pluralism of material, 
formal, efficient, and final causes, with the more restrictive Crypto-Cartesian 
views about causality that motivate standard accounts of SE and its “spooky” 
account of top-down causation and other explanatory burdens.9
As we have seen, HMA’s Neo-Aristotelian approach to psychological 
attributes, begins with animals and understands psychological attributes 
as the attributes of animals. This Neo-Aristotelian approach is radically 
different from standard accounts of SE in philosophy of mind, which neither 
approach psychological attributes by starting with animals nor even hold 
that animals are a fundamental kind of substance in their ontology. SE in 
philosophy of mind, the kind of emergentism at issue here, contends that 
irreducible mental properties emerge from physical properties in accordance 
with brute fundamental laws of emergence. These ontologically emergent 
mental properties and causal powers are just as fundamental or ontologically 
irreducible as physical properties. In other words, SE is a kind of dualism. 
SE is one position among many in contemporary philosophy of mind, 
which includes other dualisms (like substance dualism, panpsychism, and 
epiphenomenalism) and physicalist monisms (like eliminative, reductive, 
9 See Clayton and Davies 2006; Jaworski 2016; Koons Forthcoming; McLaughlin 1992; 
O’Connor and Churchill 2009; Rickabaugh Forthcoming; Stump 2012. Of course, down-
ward causation need not be identified with efficient causation. Many Neo-Aristotelians 
interpret cases of downward causation in terms of formal causality, which does not re-
quire the features presumed by standard accounts of (efficient) causation—e.g., that ef-
fects are wholly distinct events from their causes, are contingently and diachronically re-
lated—which is what renders interlevel causation problematic for explaining part-whole 
dependencies identified by NMP. Because contemporary philosophers do not understand 
emergentism or downward causation in terms of formal causality, I think it is more advis-
able for Neo-Aristotelians to avoid potential equivocations and resist the temptation to 
run hylomorphism together with emergentism and downward causation.
5(2)/2017 27
H Y LO M O R P H I C A N I M A L I S M, E M E RG E N T I S M. . .
and nonreductive physicalism). SE shares with these alternative ontologies 
of the mind the same Crypto-Cartesian conceptual framework for approach-
ing the mind and psychological attributes. Crypto-Cartesianism denotes 
a conceptual framework for approaching the mind and body. While Cartesian 
substance dualism and eliminative materialism defend two radically different 
ontologies—the former holds the mind is a substance distinct from physical 
substances, the latter rejects the existence of and theories about mental 
properties or substances distinct from physical objects—they both share 
the fundamental assumptions of a Crypto-Cartesian conceptual framework. 
Crypto-Cartesianism commences with a mental–physical dichotomy and 
a number of “intuitive” assumptions about mental and physical properties. 
From this shared starting point, different philosophies of mind undertake 
their own approach to the Herculean labors of either explaining the com-
patibility of mental and physical properties or explaining how to eliminate 
or reduce the mental to the physical.
Emergent property dualists typically defend a version of physical sub-
stance monism combined with a property dualism, where the physical 
substance grounds its physical properties, and the appropriate complex 
organization of physical properties generates distinct mental properties, 
like phenomenal conscious experiences, intentionality, beliefs, desires, 
intentions, and so forth. The less common emergentist position known as 
emergent substance dualism doubles down and maintains that complex phys-
ical substances and properties can produce novel ontologically irreducible 
substances and properties, like persons and mental properties, respectively. 
Let us focus on the standard SE’s accounts of emergent property dualism.
Proponents of SE maintain that the mental properties emerge from or-
ganized complex physical systems and only persist if the underlying physical 
systems maintain their organized complexity. These novel mental properties 
are produced by—but not realized in—certain structured or organized 
properties of a physical system. Emergent properties are products distinct 
from the organized physical properties that produced them. Depending 
upon whether the proponent of SE is an eliminativist, reductionist, or 
nonreductionist about diverse physical entities, the physical systems that 
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produce emergent properties might be animals, but they might also be the 
brains of animals or, more likely, the fundamental (perhaps subatomic) 
physical particles in the universe. Hence, SE can endorse a version of 
animalism, but it need not; indeed, some, if not most, strong emergentists 
would deny animals have mental properties. HMA can countenance a form 
of hylomorphic emergence or, more traditionally, eduction, but hylomorphic 
eductionism is fundamentally different from strong emergentism.10
HMA plays a different philosophical game insofar as it rejects nearly 
all the starting points and assumptions of Crypto-Cartesian philosophy of 
mind.11 Indeed, it is misleading to conceptualize HMA’s Neo-Aristotelian 
10 See Koons 2014; Oderberg 2007; Stump 2012; Lonergan 1992; Decaen 2000; De Haan 
Forthcoming; Brower 2014.
11 Most philosophers of mind also take for granted that all commonsense or folk psycho-
logical discourse about mental properties—with the possible exception of qualia—is 
theoretical discourse. According to this widespread view, beliefs, desires, intentions, and 
so forth are unobservable theoretical postulates that provide causal explanations of the 
observable bare bodily behavior of animals. Neo-Aristotelians reject (1) the theoretical 
model of mental attributes and folk psychology, (2) the Crypto-Cartesian false dichotomy 
between empirically observable bodily behavior and unobservable psychological/mental 
attributes, and (3) the so-called standard theories of mental causation and causal theories 
human action. See Armstrong and Malcolm 1984; Churchland and Haldane 1988; Hutto 
2012; Sellars 1963. For Neo-Aristotelians, the psychological concepts employed in our 
everyday commonsense discourse about humans and other animals are pre-theoretical. 
Furthermore, the observable behavior of animals is often psychological behavior, that is, 
the overt bodily behavior of animal is constituted from the manifestation of their psycho-
logical capacities for seeing, hearing, desiring, registering, and being in pain, and such 
psychological behavior is just as observable as their tracking, fleeing, hiding, and nurs-
ing psychological behavior. Additionally, the very meaning of our ordinary psychological 
concepts are partially constituted from our understanding of the psychological behavior of 
animals we perceptually experience. This is why certain patterns of psychological behavior 
provide the paradigmatic form of criterial evidence for the ascription of psychological 
attributes, even if this criterial evidence is defeasible in light of countervailing evidence. 
Finally, Neo-Aristotelian’s reject the causal monism and Humean assumptions that un-
derwrite the standard causal theories of the mind and human action. Instead, Neo-Aris-
totelians embrace causal and explanatory pluralism and do not hold that reasons and psy-
chological causes must be distinct existents that are merely contingently related to their 
effects. These differences, and many others, explain why Neo-Aristotelians that are true 
to their first principles adopt radically different positions in the philosophy of intentional 
action, moral psychology, human agency, and the metaphysics of free will. These complex 
issues, of course, go beyond the scope of this study. See Bennett and Hacker 2003; Hacker 
2008; Ryle 2009; Hyman 2015; Lonergan 1992; Jaworski 2016.
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views on rational and other animals as a position within philosophy of 
mind; rather, it is a philosophy of animal psychology (or, in the human 
case, a philosophical anthropology). It begins with animals, not minds or 
the physical. It rejects the Crypto-Cartesian mental–physical dichotomy 
in favor of its psychosomatic descriptions and explanations of animals and 
their psychological attributes in terms of animating forms of organized 
organic matter. A hylomorphically educed substance, like an animal, simply 
is the irreducible unified whole that is constituted from the organization 
of its material components; the animal is identified with the form-matter 
composite substance and its attributes, not with any purported mental 
or physical properties or physical substance with mental properties. Ad-
ditionally, for HMA, psychological attributes do not emerge from physical 
attributes; rather, it is the animal—the composite substance of organic 
matter organized by animating substantial form—that grounds and enables 
its psychosomatic attributes. The animal’s irreducible psychosomatic 
powers of vision, audition, perceptual registration, memory, emotion, and 
executive functions are ontologically derived from its substantial form, not 
from its physical, chemical, or biochemical attributes for these attributes 
are also ontologically grounded in the substance of the animal. For HMA, 
the substance is fundamental with respect to its attributes. Nevertheless, 
HMA, like NMP, holds that the animal’s higher-level attributes, such as its 
psychological powers, are psychosomatically constituted from the organi-
zation of the animal’s lower-level attributes, like the brain. And this is why 
HMA, again like NMP, rejects SE’s position that higher-level powers are 
emergent products distinct from the complex organization of lower–level 
attributes that cause them to exist. Said otherwise, higher-level powers, for 
HMA, are not emergent effects or distinct extrinsic products that are causally 
produced by the organization of lower-level physical factors; they simply are 
the irreducible psychosomatic powers composed of organized lower-level 
attributes. Consequently, HMA, unlike SE, can endorse NMP’s claim that 
levels of mechanisms provide constitutive and causal explanations of the 
irreducible psychological powers and manifestations that enable animals to 
engage in conscious intentional operations such as seeing, hearing, feeling, 
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and perceptually registering objects that afford fleeing from, fighting, or 
pursuing and consuming.
Eric LaRock has recently articulated an empirically sensitive version of 
emergent substance dualism that he describes as being an Aristotelian ver-
sion of strong emergentism (LaRock 2013). This is not the place to examine 
his view at length, however, it is important to draw attention to a few of 
the ways LaRock’s Aristotelian emergentism is fundamentally incompatible 
with my Aristotelian and Thomist account of hylomorphic animalism and 
hylomorphism personalism. For LaRock, the brain generates an irreducible 
emergent individual agent, which is a conscious mental agent that unifies 
the mental properties that emerge from distributed neural assemblies in the 
brain. LaRock suggests that this Aristotelian emergent agent is the “rational, 
voluntary soul (i.e., emergent agent)” and that it exercises efficient, formal, 
and final causality through which it is capable of “affecting the matter that 
generates it.” (LaRock, 388). LaRock’s treatment of the irreducible unity 
of consciousness over distributed neural modalities and agent-directed 
neural plasticity provides insightful arguments that can, with important 
modifications, be integrated into HMA and THP. 
HMA and THP are both incompatible with the SE conclusions LaRock 
draws from these arguments. This is because LaRock’s Aristotelianism is 
developed out of the same Crypto-Cartesian framework as other forms of 
SE, where it is the brain that generates the emergent conscious agent and 
its mental properties, not the hylomorphic animal substance that grounds 
both its psychosomatic powers and the subpsychological powers of the 
nervous system that materially constitute and enable these psychological 
powers. Whereas the soul is the substantial form of the animal for HMA, 
LaRock identifies the emergent individual agent with the soul and the soul 
is emergently generated by the brain, whose complex organization is not 
due to the soul and is sufficient to produce a distinct individual emergent 
agent, namely, the soul. So far as I can tell, the only significant “Aristotelian” 
difference between LaRock’s view and other forms of emergent substance 
dualism, is that emergent individuals, for LaRock, exercise not only efficient, 
but also formal and final causality on the brain, by taking advantage of the 
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brain’s plasticity and material potentialities. However, LaRock understands 
all of these forms of mental causation as forms of strong emergentist 
downward causation, which NMP and HMA reject. For these efficient, 
formal, and final mental causes are all extrinsic causes with respect to the 
physical composition and properties of the nervous system. Unlike in HMA, 
LaRock’s emergentist mental causes are not immanent efficient, formal, and 
finally causes that constitute the organization of the nervous system and 
its properties, they are separate mental properties that exercise extrinsic 
mental causation on the nervous system that produced the emergent mental 
substance in the first place.
I draw attention to these points of disagreement between LaRock’s 
Aristotelian version of SE and my own Aristotelian version of HMA to set in 
relief their radical differences as incompatible ontologies with incompatible 
approaches to neuroscience and psychology. I am not suggesting I have 
provided cogent philosophical reasons for rejecting LaRock’s philosoph-
ical defense of strong emergentism. But insofar as proponents of SE, like 
LaRock, appeal to neuroscience and psychological for empirical evidence 
of downward causation to bolster their philosophical arguments, then they 
fall squarely within the sights of NMP’s critique. Since HMA rejects this 
appeal to empirical evidence of downward causation and can endorse NMP’s 
hybrid explanations involving constitutive and causal relations, HMA is not 
vulnerable to NMP’s critique of emergentism.
The concordance of HMA and NMP on the aforementioned topics is made 
clearer still by introducing a distinction between personal and sub-personal 
level attributes and connecting it with the homunculus fallacy and what 
has been variously called Aristotle’s principle or the mereological fallacy.12 
Aristotle’s principle draws attention to conceptual confusions and category 
mistakes that arise from otherwise harmless forms of metonymy and 
synecdoche. We often speak loosely and say that the eye sees, the intellect 
understands, or my brain believes, but, as Aristotle notes, strictly speaking 
12 See Aristotle, De anima I.4.408b12–15; Aquinas, ST I.75.2ad2; Wittgenstein 2010, 
§§ 281–284; 357–361; Kenny 1971; Bennett et al. 2007; Bennett and Hacker 2003, 2012; 
Kenny 2009; De Haan and Meadows 2013; Smit and Hacker 2014.
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it is more accurate to say that it is the human that sees, understands, and 
believes by harnessing the capacities of the eye, intellect, and central nervous 
system. Such uses of synecdoche become problematic when one contends 
that psychological attributes that literally only apply to the animal as 
a whole, can also be attributed literally to parts of the animal, like its brain. 
These category mistakes are exacerbated, when psychological attributions to 
bits of the brain (or to purported cognitive information processing modules 
realized therein) are claimed to provide more cogent explanations of the 
sufficient causes of the animal’s psychological behavior, than the ordinary 
ascriptions of psychological attributes to the animal as a whole. In their 
extended critique of the influence of Crypto-Cartesianism in neuroscience, 
psychology, and philosophy, Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker call the 
systematic violation of Aristotle’s principle the mereological fallacy, because 
such errors involve mistakenly ascribing psychological attributes to parts 
of an animal, that can only be ascribed to the animal as a whole.
These category mistakes violate the homunculus fallacy as well insofar 
as they posit homunculi that are supposed to perform semi–psychological 
functions (e.g., proto-seeing or proto-rational decisions) that provide 
explanations of how the human performs full-blown psychological oper-
ations (e.g., seeing or rational decisions). The real difficulty here is with 
the claim that the mystery of how human thinking occurs is explained 
by positing homunculi in the brain that exercise proto-thinking. Such 
explanations merely introduce more mysterious processes to explain the 
less mysterious ones. It is nearly always problematic to suggest that the 
operations proprietary to a whole can be explained by postulating that the 
whole’s nonaggregative parts perform the same kind of operation—even in 
a diminished fashion—that is performed by the whole. As Bechtel points 
out, this is not the view that NMP endorses.
Typically, though, the operations within a mechanism are different from the 
phenomenon produced by the mechanism. Within a neuron, for example, 
neurotransmitters perform such operations as diffusing across a synapse and 
binding to a receptor; but the neuron itself generates action potentials. The 
point of organizing component parts and operations into a mechanism is to 
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accomplish something that cannot be performed by the individual components. 
Hence, assuming a homunculus with the same capacities as the agent in which 
it is posited to reside clearly produces no explanatory gain. (Bechtel 2009, 561)
The distinction between personal and sub-personal (or animal and sub-an-
imal) levels of description and explanation, as this distinction is employed 
by John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby, adds another layer of clarity by 
drawing attention to the specific kinds of wholes and parts at issue here, 
namely, wholes that are human persons or some other kind of animal 
(Hornsby 2000; McDowell 1994). There are kinds of anticipations, pre-
dictions, descriptions, and explanations of the psychological behavior of 
human persons (and other animals) in terms of reasons, beliefs, intentions, 
decisions, desires, wishes, emotions—in short, the whole stock of ordinary 
psychological attributes—that are proprietary with regards to the per-
sonal level (or animal level). This distinction does not mean the personal 
level psychological attributes come unmoored from sub-personal level 
explanations as is the case with interactionist substance dualism and SE. 
Indeed, like HMA, Hornsby endorses this distinction to “recover a non-du-
alist anti-physicalistic position. It takes personal-level states and powers 
to be part of our natural endowment as sentient and rational animals.” 
(Hornsby 2000, 23). Accordingly, this distinction elucidates the diverse but 
interdependent levels of ontic explanation that allow us to affirm that the 
hybrid constitutional and causal explanations of sub-personal levels enable 
the personal-level psychological abilities attributed to the human person, 
without falling victim to the confusions identified by the homunculus 
fallacy. Finally, the causal and explanatory pluralism of HMA and NMP 
not only provide a robust framework for understanding the distinction 
between personal and sub-personal level attributes, but also illuminate the 
wide range of sub-personal level attributes that exist—sub-personal level 
attributes that range from the objects treated in systems neuroscience, to 
neural assemblies, to individual neural cum glial interactions, to individual 
synaptic events, inter-/intra-cellular activities and on down to molecular, 
atomic, and subatomic activities.
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Conclusion
What do these complex issues have to Thomist hylomorphic personalism? 
The comparisons of HMA, NMP, and SE in the previous sections were neither 
intended to be defenses nor refutations of any of these complex positions. 
My aim was to clarify why the distinct frameworks that drive SE and HMA 
render these two ontologies fundamentally incompatible, and therefore why 
NMP’s challenge to SE is not directed at HMA, which is compatible with 
NMP. But what about the more contentious claims of Thomist hylomorphic 
personalism? How does it fit within the less controversial picture provided 
by HMA and NMP? What distinguishes its account of the interaction of 
immaterial intellectual operations with psychosomatic operations from the 
strong emergentism critiqued by NMP? These questions will be addressed 
in a second article that builds upon the foundation laid in this article.13
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